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by
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Host mobility is becoming an increasingly important feature with the recent
arrival of laptop and palmtop computers, the development of wireless network
interfaces and the implementation of global networks. Unfortunately, this mobile
environment is also much more vulnerable to penetration by intruders. A possible
means of protection can be authentication. This guarantees the identity of a
communication peer.
This thesis studies the constraints imposed on the mobile environment with
respect to authentication. It compares the two prevailing authentication mechanisms,
Kerberos and SPX, and tries to make suggestions of how a mechanism can be adapted
to the mobile environment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of computers has followed several parallel tracks. After the advent
of bulky, expensive, and rare "mainframe" computers, they quickly evolved to
timesharing systems, thereby bringing computational facilities to those individuals
with access to a terminal. The development of the microprocessor led, in turn, to
the concept of the personal computer (PC). Further advances in technology have
made it possible to pack a personal computer, ranging in computational power from
a simple "PC" to a fairly powerful workstation, into a small, lightweight, portable
device, which satisfies the user's desire to access computational resources at their
fingertips, and enable them to carry those resources with them.
Besides the increase in functionality of computers, the evolving availability of
wireless network options support this striving for mobility. The wide—spread grid
of wireless cells provides the user with continuous network access regardless of their
location. A user is no longer restricted to stay in reach of a tap for a network
connection.
This recent emergence in technology which supports user mobility has also
prompted new security requirements and concerns. This is mainly due to the lack
of physical protection mechanisms as in the traditional fixed—topology, static—user
environment. The main problems are to prevent illegal access (fraud), impersonating,
and eavesdropping in the mobile environment. Wireless communications are even
more vulnerable to these kinds of attacks. Since one can not exhaustively search the
transmission medium for intruders, it is easier for them to penetrate the network.
Moreover, with increasing size of the cells due to the improving strength of the
sending and receiving devices the space for an intruder to hide increases, too.
2Authentication might be a means of protection against the first two kinds of
attacks. It is the process of identifying an individual, as well as the verification
of this pretended identity. This assures a communication peer about the trustwor-
thiness of his partner. The third type of attack, eavesdropping, can not be remedied
with mere authentication. Therefore, it is necessary to encrypt messages sent over
the network. However, authentication can at least provide auxiliary function. In
addition to authenticating an individual, the authentication exchange can also serve
the purpose of securely providing communication parties with a session key to protect
subsequent communications.
There already exists implemented authentication mechanisms. The predominant
mechanisms include Kerberos and SPX. Kerberos is based on a private key
cryptosystem, whereas SPX is built upon a public key cryptosystem. The mobile
environment has some specific aspects to consider. This is in regard to the limitations
of the devices used, like computing power and memory, as well as the unreliability
of the transmission medium.
The next chapter gives an introduction of what authentication is, and how it
works. Following, is a reflect on mobility, considering the constraints in the mobile
environment and the current work in this area. Chapters 4 and 5 present an overview
of the two prevailing authentication mechanism, Kerberos and SPX, respectively.
Next is a comparison of these two mechanisms, considering the advantages and disad-
vantages of each one in different areas. Chapter 7 tries to make assumptions of how
a mechanism could be adapted to the mobile environment. The last chapter provides
an outlook on further work in this area and a conclusion.
CHAPTER 2
AUTHENTICATION
2.1 Threats
Networks are exposed to various attacks from enemies who may have access to the
network or to the attached machines. These intruders may try to steal, or change
messages, in order to obtain information or impersonate an other user. The potential
threats for the transfer of information are:
• Identity interception: the identity of one or more of the users involved in a
communication is observed for misuse. Possible remedial measures to protect
against this unauthorized disclosure is the use of encryption of the data to be
transferred.
• Masquerade: the pretense by a user to be a different user in order to gain
access to information or to acquire additional privileges. To prevent this kind
of attack, it is possible to require the user to prove his knowledge of a secret.
Either by presenting it, or by performing a certain operation, only the owner
of the secret is able to. An example would be the knowledge of a password for
most of the login procedures.
• Replay: the recording and subsequent replay of a communication at a later
date. Replay detection can be provided by using timestamps, combined with
remembering previously sent messages, or by challenge and response exchanges.
• Data interception: the observation of user data during a communication by
an unauthorized user. This enables the intruder to slip between the communi-
cation partners, and modify the channel, unnoticed. The protection measures
are the same as for identity interception.
3
4• Manipulation: the replacement, insertion, deletion or misordering of user
data during a communication by an unauthorized user. A checksum of the
message, attached before encryption can prevent this kind of attack.
• Repudiation: the denial by a user of having participated in part or all of
a communication. In this case, the signing of the message by the sender can
prove the originator. A signature is the encryption of a compressed string of
relevant data to be transferred.
Especially related to authentication, there are some additional threats to consider
that are beyond the compromise of the communication channel, but rather related
to the user preserving their prudence:
• Compromise of the user's key: one of the basic principles of authentication
is that the user's secret key remains hidden to the outside—world. A number of
practical methods are available for the user to hold his secret key in a manner
that provides adequate security, like Smartcard, encrypted files, or floppy disks.
• Forging of a certificate or ticket: the malicious attempt of an attacker to
construct some evidence to impersonate a user, thus misleading the commu-
nication partner about his identity. Consequently, it is very important that
the authorities responsible for signing certificates are physical highly secure,
trusted and well known to the public. Hence, a principle is able to verify the
authenticity of a received certificate properly through the use of the public—
known key of this authority.
• Attack on the cryptographic system: trying to break the system by the
application of cryptoanalysis l . The likelihood of such an exposure should be
'The study and development of methods by which, without prior knowledge of the
key, plaintext may be deduced from encrypted text, given sufficient working material and
computational power. One aim of cryptoanalysis would be to discover the key, but that
may not always be necessary[1].
5negligible, and the designers of cryptosystems try to build in this property; at
least from their current point of view.
2.2 Mechanism
To protect against perceived threats, various security services need to be provided.
Besides access control, data confidentiality, and data integrity, peer entity authen-
tication is the one of our concerns. The main goal of this service is to prevent
impersonation, that is, the pretense to a false identity. It ensures that a user in
a certain instance of communication is the one claimed. It can also be used to
protect against replay of previously recorded messages. Authentication can either
be single, where only one of the participants proves identity, or mutual, where both
users authenticate each other.
The exchange of authentication information might be simple or strong. Simple
authentication relies on the originator supplying its name and password, which are
checked by the recipient. In contrast, strong authentication is based upon crypto-
graphic techniques to protect the exchange of validating information. The data
transferred is sent in encrypted form. Thus, this technique permits one to provide
evidence that they know a particular secret without revealing anything about it.
The negotiation of which authentication mechanism is to be used takes place
prior to the actual communication, and need not necessarily be performed via
computer. A telephone call, or a face—to—face meeting might also be appropriate,
in order to avoid compromising any information to the later used communication
medium.
CHAPTER 3
MOBILITY
After looking at the purpose of authentication, there are several aspects to consider
that are specific for the mobile environment and the mobile devices used within, i.e.,
laptops and palmtops.
3.1 Constraints
3.1.1 Hardware and Software
Mobile devices are far more vulnerable to physical attacks than their counterparts in
a fixed network. Workstations and PCs are installed at one place, and are intended to
stay there. Their disappearance is less probable and much more conspicuous than the
theft of a mobile device, that can be stolen whenever it is left without surveillance.
Besides the physical facts that impede the security of a mobile device, there exist
also some hardware and software constraints:
• Computing power: due to their physical dimensions, mobile devices don't
have the computing power comparable to PCs or even workstations. This
implies that the overhead induced by communication and processing for
additional security mechanisms, mainly authentication, should be kept as low
as possible.
• Limited battery life: imposes careful usage of the power consuming units,
such as CPU and memory. Therefore, overhead produced by the operations
involved in the authentication mechanism, like encryption and storage of keys,
should also be minimized.
• Secondary memory: the problem is, where to store the keys that the user
needs for secure communication in a protected fashion, without exposing them
6
7to an intruder who can gain unauthorized access to the mobile device. One
possibility would be to keep the keys on a floppy disk, but then the user
would have to carry the floppy disk around. A better approach to remedy
this potential weakness, is to store the keys encrypted under a password, thus
the user has an additional means of protection.
• Type of operating system: a multi—tasking operating system would be
preferable. Thereby performing authentication in the background, without
interfering the current running application.
3.1.2 Communication Medium
The limitations of the bandwidth suggest that the use of messages to and from the
mobile unit be as small as possible, and the main work be shifted away from the
mobile units; to the hosts in the fixed network. Another implication might be the
preference of the datagram as a message vehicle. Therefore, it is not necessary to
maintain a connection between two parties, which obviously induces some communi-
cation overhead. Moreover, datagrams eliminate the necessity of using session keys
to provide a secure channel. Each single datagram can be individually protected
against spoofing or corruption, thus excluding the possibility of an intruder taking
over the connection after it has been established.
In addition, distortion by noise and interference, the limited bandwidth of
the medium, as well as the unreliability of the link causes more delayed and lost
messages than in a fixed network, which emphasizes the importance of the number
of messages exchanged for authentication. This might be remedied in the future,
when the currently predominant analog transmission medium is replaced by the
next digital based generation with a higher reliability.
83.1.3 Security & Trust
Security is a major controversial issue in mobile computing, but presently, is largely
ignored which is typical for a discipline in its infancy. Besides the high risk of a
mobile unit to get stolen, the security of the operating system is its main weakness.
DOS as the prevailing operating system for mobile devices, like laptops and palmtops
right now, cannot be trusted due to a lack of protection mechanisms for user files,
the user address space, and the possible recording of user action in the form of a
log. This also implies the separation of the key generation from the remainder of
the operating system; thereby establishing it as a trusted operation that is protected
against penetration.
Mobile users are using resources, including software, at various locations. These
resources may be made available by different service providers. Thus, a concept of
trusts needs to be developed to allow mobile clients to use resources of different
servers at different locations. In a mobile environment, control has to be exercised
over the operations allowed to be performed by the different users at the different
sites. The designated authorities are usually the authentication server. They must
determine whether a user is granted access to the network services or not. This
raises the question of how far a user can trust such a server in another domain. Also,
how far a server is willing to trust an incoming user, especially with their different
notion of trust. One domain might follow the policy to trust everybody they know
personally, whereas other domains insist on a proof of their pretended identity.
3.2 IP for Mobile Computing
Right now, the researchers around the country, mainly the members of the IETF
mobile-ip working group, are trying to establish a general protocol for the use of
IP in the mobile environment. It compromises the two different approaches, based
'The notion of trust is based on the fact that an entity A trusts an entity B in some
respect informally means that A believes that B will behave in a certain way
9on the research done by Perkins and Bhagwat at the IBM Research Center [2], and
John Ioannidis et al. at Columbia University [3].
This mobile host protocol should provide operational (i.e., users do not need
to perform any special actions due to host migration) and performance transparency
(the performance of a running application should be similar to that of the same
application running on a fixed host). Operational transparency can be achieved by
providing mechanisms to detect migration and to perform the appropriate actions to
ensure continuing network services, whereas performance transparency needs optimal
routing of packets to and from the mobile host (MIT), as well as efficient use of
network resources, such as transmission and processing bandwidth.
The Columbia protocol The fundamental concept in the Columbia mobile host
protocol is its definition of a virtual mobile subnet spread across a number of real
subnets. The mobile subnet exists wherever a Mobile Support Router (MSR) is
located. The MSRs provide a gateway between the real subnets and the mobile
ones. A MIT is allocated a constant address on the mobile subnet. This means that
higher layer protocols have an unchanging view of a MH's identity. The fact that the
mobile subnet is spread across a number of real subnets gives the MH its mobility.
Figure 3.1 shows an example network, which illustrates a typical
environment with a number of Ethernet segments (IP subnets 2.x, 3.x)
connected to backbone (1.x) via routers. Cooperating MSRs are attached to each
segment defining two mobile subnets (4.x, 5.x) that are spread across the Ethernet
segments. Also shown is Mill and a fixed host (Fill). Mill is physically connected
to segment 3 and has already registered with MSR3 having identified it as its local
MSR by listening for and responding to a Beacon packet that each MSR transmits
at regular intervals.
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Figure 3.1 Example Columbia Network
If now Fill wants to transmit a packet to MH1, the packet will initially be
routed using existing routing protocols to the nearest router that advertises connec-
tivity to the mobile subnet (probably MSR2 in this case). If MSR2 doesn't know the
current location of MH1, it sends a broadcast packet to all MSRs asking who has
MH1 registered with it. MSR3 will reply, and MSR2 tunnels any packets addressed
to MH1, using an encapsulation protocol, to MSR3, which delivers it to the Mill.
If MH1 migrates now to segment 2, it registers with MSR2. MSR2 sends
a forwarding pointer back to MSR3 informing it of MH1's new location. Future
packets to and from Fill will then be directly delivered, because the Mil is now in
the same subnet.
The IBM protocol The IBM protocol relies on TCP and UDP facilities to
assist in the provision of mobility. The key idea in this concept is that each packet
originating from a Mil contains enough routing information that can be used by the
remote host to send a reply back to the source along an optimal path. When TCP or
11
Figure 3.2 IBM protocol example
UDP receive a packet with a loose source routing (LSSR) option in the header, they
send any packet in reply by the same path in reverse. These facilities allow existing
hosts in the fixed network to participate in the routing of MHs. Whenever a MH
connects to a network it must first register with a Base Station (BAS) that is also
attached to the local subnet. A MH must also notify its Mobile Router (MR) of the
address of the BAS (it is the MH's current location). A MH advertises connectivity
to a group of MHs that it is configured to handle the existing routing protocols.
If a FPI wants to transmit a packet to the MH, it transmits the packet normally
and the packet is routed using existing routing protocols to the MH's MR. On
receiving the packet the MR looks up the current location of the MH and inserts
a LSSR option in the packet with the MH's current BAS as the first hop. The
packet is then forwarded to the MH. Any return traffic from the MH to the FH
specifies a LSSR option with the BAS as the first hop. When the FH receives this
packet, it "learns" the MH's location, and sends subsequent packets directly to the
MH's current BAS. This scenario is depicted in figure 3.2.
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When a MH migrates to another subnet, it first registers with the new BAS,
then notifies the MR of the new location and sends a message to the previous BAS
telling it to delete its entry. Subsequent packets from the FH to the MH will be
redirected by the original BAS back to the MR for correct routing until a packet
from the MH to the FH forces the FH to route packets correctly via the new BAS.
3.3 Temporary residence
The basic assumption of user mobility is that a user has one home. A user's home is
the administrative domain where he is registered on a long—term basis.
As a user migrates throughout an internetwork, he periodically pops up in
a new, foreign domain. Regardless of the type of access, i.e., via wireless link or
plugged into a fixed network, the goal of a mobile user is to obtain some service from
the network. A user may simply be passing through a foreign domain or may be
planning to linger about for some time. In either case, he must establish temporary
residence in the foreign domain to obtain the service locally.
This process is similar to mobility in the real—world. For example, a person
traveling from one country to another must engage in some form of a bureaucratic
procedure with the purpose of establishing temporary physical residence at the new
location.
This procedure can vary from country to country, as well as between different
domains in a network. In most cases, it may be sufficient for a mobile user to possess
a universal credential (passport/public—key certificate). Thus, a foreign domain can
verify his identity. To get some information about the current status of a user, it
might be necessary to interact with the user's home domain.
CHAPTER 4
KERBEROS
4.1 Introduction
Kerberos was designed for Project Athena at MIT[4, 5]. Kerberos, as well as SPX,
represent client—server authentication mechanisms. Kerberos identifies clients of
network services across an insecure network and protects the privacy and integrity
of communication with those services. Its services are generally available to an
application program through a programming interface. It is based on a symmetric
cryptosysteml, whereas SPX uses a public—key cryptosystem.
The computing environment consists of individual workstations privately
owned and operated, similar to the laptops and palmtops in the mobile environment.
Therefore, a workstation cannot be trusted to identify users correctly to network
services.
The design is a refinement of ideas presented in Needham and Schroeder [6]. It
incorporates trusted third—party authentication servers. The key idea for Kerberos
authentication is the following: to use a service, a client must supply a ticket 2 ,
previously obtained from Kerberos. The basic components include Kerberos authen-
tication and ticket—granting servers (TGSs). A database contains information on
each principal. It stores a copy of each principal's key that it shares with Kerberos.
For a user principal, its shared secret key is computed from its password under use
of some one—way function. Kerberos servers and TGSs read the databases in the
course of authentication.
'In these cryptosystems, both sender and receiver must know the same secret key, which
is used to both encipher and decipher a message. Nothing distinguishes the communication
parties and, therefore, it provides a protected channel in both directions
2 A ticket is a record that authenticates a client to a service; it contains the client's
identity, a session key, and a timestamp, all of which is sealed by encryption using the
service's private key.
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Kerberos uses two main protocols. The credential—initialization protocol
authenticates user logins and installs initial tickets at the login host. A client uses
then the client—server authentication protocol to request services from a server.
4.2 Names
A principal, whether it is a client or a server, is the basic entity that participates in
authentication. In most cases a principal represents a user or an instantiation of a
network service on a particular host. As far as the authentication server is concerned,
they are equivalent. A name consists of a primary name, an instance, and a realm,
expressed as:
name.instance@realm
If the principal is a, user, a genuine person, the primary name is the login identifier,
and the instance is either null or represents particular attributes of the user, i.e.,
root, admin. For a service, the service name is used as the primary name and the
machine name is used as the instance, i.e., rlogin.myhost. A Kerberos ticket is only
good for a single named server. As such, a separate ticket is required to gain access
to different instances of the same service. The realm is used to distinguish among
different authentication domains; thus, there need not be one giant, and universally
trusted, Kerberos database serving an entire company.
4.3 How it works
4.3.1 Getting the initial ticket
First of all, the user establishes a principal name and a private key, through some
channel outside the system, for example, by walking up to the system adminis-
trator, and presenting his or her identification card. When the user now goes to a
workstation, he logs into the system by using the credential—initialization protocol.
The only piece of information that can prove his identity is his password. The initial
15
exchange with the authentication server is designed to minimize the chance that the
password will be compromised. At the same time doesn't allow a user to properly
authenticate himself without knowledge of that password. The protocol is specified
as follows:
1. The user presents the workstation (client) with his principal name.
2. The workstation knows the name of its default realm. If not, another one is
given by the user, and the complete name is composed. It then requests a
ticket—granting ticket for the TGS from the authentication server (AS). This
request is passed over the network in cleartext.
3. The AS looks up the name for the user and the TGS, finding the private keys
for them in the database. It creates a temporary session key for use in the
initial session between the client and the TGS, and prepares a ticket for the
TGS.
4. The AS sends back the ticket and a copy of the session key encrypted under
the key which is derived from the user's password.
5. The workstation asks the user for the password.
6. The workstation derives the key for decrypting the response from the AS from
the typed—in password of the user. If it was correct, the workstation is able to
decrypt the packet, and obtains the session key and the ticket for the TGS. It
compares the timestamp in the response with the corresponding value in the
initial request. If the response passes this test, the user knows for certain that
the response was prepared by the Kerberos AS, because that is the only other
entity in the universe that knows the user's private key.
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- User -> WS: Principal name
0 - Client -> AS: Client name,TGS name0 - AS -> Client: Ticket for TGS,
Session key0 - User -> WS: Password
0 
	°CA SDUser 0
Figure 4.1 Getting the initial ticket
The exchange between the user, the client (workstation), and the AS is shown
in Figure 4.1.
4.3.2 Requesting a service
After obtaining the initial ticket—granting ticket, a principal can request a server
ticket from a TGS. The initial ticket is encrypted with a shared key between TGS
and Kerberos.
Because a ticket is susceptible to interception or copying, it does not constitute
sufficient proof of identity. Therefore, a principal presenting a ticket must also
demonstrate knowledge of the session key included in the ticket. This proof is
provided through an authenticator sent along with the ticket to the server. An
authenticator is a simple mechanism designed to discourage attempts of unauthorized
reuse ("replay") of tickets by someone who notices a ticket going by on the network
and makes a copy.
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The authenticator consists of, among other things, the client's name, network
address, and the current time of day all sealed with the key that Kerberos issued for
this session.
The basic steps of the client-server authentication are (see figure 4.2):
1. Client presents the ticket-granting ticket, an authenticator, and the the name
of the desired server to the TGS.
2. The TGS goes through the same procedure as does any other Kerberos-
mediated service. First it decrypts the ticket with its private key, and uses
the temporary session key found inside to decrypt the authenticator. If all
the authenticity checks verify correctly, the TGS knows the identity of the
requesting client. It then looks up the service name in its database and finds
the private key for that service.
0 - Client -> TGS: Authenticator,
Ticket-granting ticket
0 - TGS -> Client: Ticket for server,Session key
0 - Client -> Server: Authenticator,
Ticket
Figure 4.2 Getting a service ticket and requesting the service
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3. The TGS creates a ticket with a new temporary session key for use between
the client and the server. It is then sealed with the session key (obtained
from the ticket in the request) and sent back to the client. This response is
identical to the the form of the original response of the AS when it returned
the ticket—granting ticket.
4. The client decrypts the response with the stored session key, and obtains the
ticket for the desired service. The client is now able to present this ticket and
a new authenticator to the server.
5. The server verifies the identity in a similar fashion as the TGS, by first
decrypting the ticket with his private key. This ,simultaneously, proves the
TGS as its originator. The server then checks the information in the authen-
ticator on correctness. If the client's name and the network address of the
incoming packet, in the ticket, and in the authenticator match, and the
timstamps in the ticket and authenticator have not expired, then the request
is taken as legitimate.
If the application requires mutual authentication, there would be an additional
message sent in response to the client's request, in which the server adds one to
the received timestamp, seals it with the session key obtained from the ticket, and
sends it back to the client. This demonstrates that the server was able to read the
timestamp from the authenticator, and hence that it knows the session key. It in
turn is only available in the ticket, which is encrypted in the server's private key.
CHAPTER 5
SPX
5.1 Introduction
This authentication service is also intended for open-network environments [7]. In
contrast to Kerberos, it is a public-key cryptography' [8] based authentication
service. It shares many concepts and data structures in common with ISO/CCITT
X.509 Directory Authentication [9]. SPX resembles in its functionalities Kerberos. It
has credential-initialization and client-server authentication protocols. In addition,
it has an enrollment protocol that registers new principals. It differs from Kerberos
in the fact, that it eliminates the need for an on-line trusted authentication server. A
certificate can be stored without any additional protection after it has been signed by
a certification authority (CA). Moreover, it makes extensive use of hierarchical trust
relationships, for naming as well as for the organization of the CA, which facilitates
the scalability of SPX.
SPX has a Login Enrollment Agent Facility (LEAF) and a Certification
Distribution Center (CDC) that correspond to Kerberos authentication servers and
TGSs. LEAF, which is similar to the Kerberos authentication servers, is used in
the credential-initialization protocol. CDC is an on-line depository consisting of
public-key certificates (for principals and CA) and the encrypted private keys of
principals. Note that the CDC need not be trustworthy because everything stored
in it is encrypted and can be verified independently by principals.
SPX also contains hierarchically organized CAs, which operate off line and are
selectively trusted by principals. Their function is to issue public-key certificates
'These cryptosystems involve a pair of keys, one of which is used for enciphering and the
other for deciphering. One of the keys, known as the public key, is publicly known, whereas
the other, the secret or private one, is kept private. Only possession of the complementary
key enables deciphering of a messages enciphered under the other key. It is computationally
infeasible to derive the secret key from knowledge of the public one.
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(binding names and public keys of principals). Global trust is not needed in SPX.
Each CA typically has jurisdiction over just one subset of all principals, while each
principal trusts only a subset of all CAs, referred to as the trusted authorities of the
principal. System scalability is greatly enhanced by the absence of global trust and
on-line trusted components.
5.2 Names
The names in SPX for principals in certificates are X.500 [10] hierarchical names.
X.500 names have a form unlike the simple string names used in most other naming
schemes, for example, by the Internet Domain Name Service (used by Kerberos). An
X.500 name is a sequence of "Relative Distinguished Names" (RDN's) that can also
be considered as a path of pointers for navigating through a hierarchical database.
Figure 5.1 Sample of a naming tree (X.500)
The topmost level, after the root, accommodates the country of the principal
described, followed by the organization. These two entries compose the domain prefix
of the name. Next in the hierarchy, are the entries for the organizational unit, and
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finally a common name for the principal. A sample naming tree is shown in figure
5.1. For example, a name based on this tree, that describes the user "Smith" in the
organizational unit "CIS Department" of the organization "NET" in the country
"US" would be denoted as:
/C=US /0."NJIT" /OU="CIS Department" /CN="Smith"
5.3 X.509
5.3.1 Certificates
A certificate contains the public key of a user, together with some other infor-
mation. It includes an expiration date for the certificate, and the user's as well
as the CA's (that issued the certificate) distinguished name, rendered unforgeable
by encipherment under the secret key of a CA which issued it. It allows verification
of the claim that a given public key does in fact belong to a given individual. Every
user who knows the public key of a CA can retrieve the public key of another user
by obtaining and decrypting the certificate corresponding to that user, issued by this
CA.
A CA is an authority trusted by one or more users that creates and assigns
certificates. It vouches for the binding of a public key to a user. Optionally, the
CA may create the user's keys, since it is assumed to be physical secure, as well
as running a trusted operating system. Thus, it is capable of generating keys in a
protected fashion. On the other side, this involves transmission of the private key,
which makes the key susceptible to interception.
5.3.2 The Hierarchy Structure
The CAs build up a hierarchical structure, similar to the one used by the naming
scheme, further referred to as directory or tree, respectively. The higher level nodes
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in this tree represent organizational or country—wide authorities. A CA can only
guarantee the bindings of subordinate principals and CAs, and for its parent CA.
In order to authenticate another principal, a principal has to obtain the certi-
fication path from its location in the tree to the location of the principal seeking
authentication. A certification path is defined by an ordered sequence of certificates
of principals within the tree. Together with the public key of the initial principal,
the sequence can be processed to obtain the public key of the final principal in the
path.
It is possible to circumvent the hierarchical structure by using cross—certificates
as either an optimization technique to shorten the path or to bypass an untrusted
authority. These certificates must be established with bilateral agreement. An
example would be a company communicating with a branch in Iraq, but not neces-
sarily trusting the regime in Bagdad to reliable forward information. They would
bypass the country—authority of Iraq, and would only include their own branch
organization in the certification path.
5.4 Authentication and Key Distribution
Before a principal can participate in any authentication procedure, it has to install
its certificate(s), after they are signed by a trusted authority, its encrypted private
key, and a hash of its password in the CDC via the LEAF server. Thereby, they
are generally available to SPX components when needed. In order for a principal to
enroll itself in the CDC, it is necessary that the LEAF server have a trusted authority
for the CA that issued the principal's certificate.
When a user walks up to his workstation, he initiates by entering his name
and his password a login request to LEAF. LEAF reads the user's encrypted private
key and the expected hashed password value from the CDC. If the one—way hash of
the password from the CDC matches what was received in the request, then LEAF
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returns the encrypted private key. The principal now generates a short-term key pair,
and creates its login ticket structure. It contains a validity interval, the principal's
uid, and the newly generated short—term public key, all signed using the long—term
private key. Finally, the user gets his trusted authority certificates from the CDC.
He uses the public key included in these certificates to verify the server certificates
in subsequent authentication exchanges.
As in Kerberos, all authentication is done on behalf of principals. There exists
a claimant principal, that is the entity seeking to be recognized as authentic, and a
verifier principal trying to authenticate the claimant.
The approach to strong authentication taken in SPX makes use of the properties
of public—key cryptosystems (PKCS). One of these properties is the interchange-
ability of the keys in the enciphering/deciphering process. This implies, that it is
possible to encipher a message with the public key, and decipher it with the private
key, and vice versa.
Authentication relies on each principal possessing a unique distinguished name
(see section 4.2). Each principal is identified by possession of its secret key. A second
principal is able to determine if a communication partner is in possession of the secret
key, and can use this to corroborate that the communication partner is in fact the
principal it pretends to be. The validity of this corroboration depends on the secret
key remaining confidential to the user.
The authentication exchange is performed in the following way (see figure 5.2):
1. The claimant requests public key certificates for the verifier principal (1), and
receives one or more certificates (2) depending upon the trusted authorities.
In the simple case, the claimant is able to obtain a certificate that can directly
be verified, because it has the public key of the authority that issued the
certificate(s) for the verifier. In more complicated situations, the claimant may
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Figure 5.2 SPX authentication exchange
need up to two more certificates, namely a forward and a backward certification
path to the verifier.
2. The claimant then generates a DES session key and encrypts it using the
verifier's public key. It then generates an authenticator containing either a
timestamp or a nonce2 , sealed with the DES key. If delegating is desired, the
delegation key is also protected with the DES key, otherwise the claimant signs
the encrypted DES key as a proof of its knowledge of the private delegation
key without revealing it.
3. The claimant sends the authenticator, the delegator, and its ticket (created
during the credential—initialization) to the verifier (3).
4. The verifier obtains the certificates it needs to verify that the ticket was created
by the claimant from its CDC (4,5). It stores the delegation key, if required,
2A nonce is information that is guaranteed fresh, that is, it has not appeared or been
used before. Perfect random numbers are good nonce candidates; however, their effec-
tiveness is dependent upon the randomness that is practically achievable.
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and unwraps the authenticator. In the mutual authentication case, the verifier
returns the authenticator encrypted as a response (6).
Note that while an authenticator can be used only once, it is possible to re—establish
the same authentication context multiple times. That is, the ticket and DES estab-
lishment components of the authentication token may have a relatively long lifetime.
This permits a performance improvement, since repeated applications of public key
operations can be alleviated. Therefore, one caches the authentication context, from
a successfully used authentication token and the associated verified principal public
key value.
CHAPTER 6
COMPARISON BETWEEN KERBEROS AND SPX
6.1 The Key System
The main, and most obvious difference between Kerberos and SPX is that they
are based on two different cryptographic systems, SPX on public-key systems and
Kerberos, in contrast, on secret-key systems.
The primary advantage of public-key cryptography is increased security: the
secret key does not need to be transmitted or communicated to anyone; no one else
needs to be trusted. In a secret-key system, there is always a chance that an enemy
could discover the secret key while it is being transmitted.
Another major advantage of public-key systems is that they can provide a
method for digital signatures. These signatures can be used as proof of the origin
of the message, and thus authenticate the sender. Authentication via secret-key
systems requires the sharing of some secret and sometimes requires trust of a third
party as well, like the authentication server in Kerberos.
The main disadvantage of public-key cryptography is speed: there are popular
secret-key encryption methods, as DES used in Kerberos, that are significantly faster
than any currently available public-key method. SPX takes this into account by using
a hybrid approach. The unique key distribution and authentication is designed based
on a public-key system, whereas the subsequent communication is protected through
session keys.
6.2 Naming
In version 4 of Kerberos, principals are named with three components: name,
instance and domain, each of which may be up to 39 characters long. These sizes
are too short for some applications and installation requirements. Especially for
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big organizations which have structured their network into multiple subnetworks
(domains) in a hierarchical manner. They maintain authentication servers for each
of these domains, thus having to distinguish them from each other. They might not
be able to form a meaningful domain name, since they can only identify each subnet
with a short string in order to avoid exceeding the maximal string length.
This has been substituted in version 5 [11] by a principal identifier that is
composed of multi-component names. The identifier is encoded in two parts, the
domain and the remainder of the name, following the ASN.1 conventions. Therefore,
it is possible to assign one string (component) to each subnet, and concatenate them
to the domain name.
SPX uses distinguished names as identifiers for principals. The name is
arranged in a hierarchical manner that imposes no restriction on length and
characters used. It also facilitates the acquisition of a certification path due to
inherent location information.
6.3 IP Dependence
The current running version of Kerberos, version 4, requires the use of TCP /IP as
the underlying network protocol, since the decision whether or not a principal is
considered as authenticated is basically based on the IP address of the workstation
included in the authenticator as a proof of the origin of the service request. Moreover,
the prevailing implementation of Kerberos, like FTP and TELNET, also assume
TCP/IP as the underlying protocol. In version 5, this is partly remedied by intro-
ducing a type and length field in the message. Thereby, the recipient can interpret
different network address types properly, however it still requires the use of a network
address in the authenticator.
SPX is not as restricted on the use of any specific network protocol. Although
it is based on TCP/IP right now, it doesn't use any location—dependent information
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to prove identity. The possession of a private key corresponding to the public key
retrieved from a CDC proves the identity of a principal, both the claimant's and the
verifier's.
6.4 Certificates versus Session Keys
A ticket's extent is limited to the domain (realm) of its Kerberos server. This implies
that a user entering a new domain has first to obtain a new ticket granting ticket
for this domain, and then a new server ticket in order to receive a new session key
for use with the services from the new domain. Therefore, there is a need of trust
on both sides. Not only from the authentication server side in regard to the entrant,
but also from the user in regard to the key distribution center in the new domain.
The authentication server of the new domain has to verify the user's identity in order
to believe him not to jeopardize the security of the network. However, the user has
also to make sure that the session keys he receives are not compromised. Otherwise
any subsequent communication is exposed to interception.
SPX doesn't need this kind of trust relationship. It overcomes the limitations
of the trusted key distribution center of Kerberos by the use of RSA. As soon as
a principal has obtained its private key from the CDC, there is no need to trust
anybody else besides its trusted authorities. It can sign any message, send it to a
communication peer, and the receiver can verify the origin of the message and the
identity of the principal by simply obtaining the corresponding public key certificate
from one of its trusted authorities.
6.5 Delegation
The "representation" of the user in the process is a set of credentials. These
credentials include the user's identity as well as a secret cryptographic key that
"speaks" for the user. That is, any process that can demonstrate that it possesses
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this key may be taken as acting on behalf of the user. If a user process spawns
another process on another machine, say, by doing a remote login, credentials may
be needed on the remote system as well. They enable the remote process to do
subsequent remote accesses on behalf of the user. The act of handing off credentials
to another principal, so that the receiving principal can act on behalf of the initiating
principal, is called delegation.
Delegation is not provided in Kerberos version 4. The remedy - manually
requesting tickets on all remote machines - is inadequate as it requires the entry
of a password, which would be transmitted unencrypted across the network. In
version 5, it can be implemented through contacting the TGS with an additional
ticket exchange and requesting a ticket valid for a different set of addresses than the
ticket-granting ticket used in the request. However, this induces overhead due to the
extra messages sent.
SPX can do this kind of representation transfer automatically, when needed
(depending on the kind of security desired). The private delegation key that speaks
for a user is transferred encrypted during the authentication phase.
6.6 Inter-domain Authentication
For inter-domain authentication, it is important to have global names and a trust
relationship between domains. The latter one can be established by either sharing of
a key between CAs that are willing to trust each other, or by installing the public keys
of all trusted remote CAs in a local CA database, and introducing an inter-domain
authority.
Kerberos can be used for authentication across administrative or organizational
domains. It is based on the exchange of session keys between the involved domains'
TGS, and the hierarchical based domain structure. A source domain is interop-
erable with a destination domain if it shares an inter-domain key directly with the
30
destination domain, or if it shares a key with an intermediate domain that is itself
interoperable with the destination domain. Each domain exchanges a different pair
of inter—domain keys with its parent and child node. When an application needs
to contact a server in a foreign domain, it "walks" up and down the tree hierarchy
toward the destination domain, contacting each domain's key distribution center.
They provide a ticket—granting ticket to the next domain in the proper direction on
the tree. When a ticket for the end service is finally issued, it contains an enumeration
of all the domains consulted in the process of requesting the service. An application
server can then decide, whether or not it wants to grant service based on the inter-
mediate domain passed.
In contrast, inter—domain authentication in SPX is simply performed by the
obtaining of the certification path to the appropriate server (verifier) by the client
(claimant), and the presentation of the claimant's certificate combined with the corre-
sponding return certification path, in order to verify the certificate, to this server.
As far as obtaining tickets or keys is concerned, there is no interaction involved with
any key distribution or authentication server in the intermediate domains. Since
there is enough location information included in the domain part of the name of the
desired service, the claimant can directly request the certificates for the service from
the corresponding CDC in the remote domain. Once these certificates are retrieved
and verified by the trusted authorities of the claimant, it can issue an authentication
token to the remote server, who will be expected to call back the claimant's CDC to
retrieve whatever certificates it needs, based on its own trusted authorities.
6.7 Summary
In addition to the points described in the previous sections, there exist some
additional aspects (see APPENDIX A for a complete table). With respect to mobile
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computing, and the constraints mentioned in chapter 3, SPX is the preferable choice
as an authentication mechanism in this kind of environment.
The main reason for this decision has been the benefits gained by using
certificates instead of session keys. It removes the need of trust relationships
between domains. When a mobile user moves across domain boundaries, he does not
need to obtain keys in order to establish a secure channel to perform the necessary
authentication procedure. The encrypting of a ticket with the private key is enough
of a proof of the sender's identity. Furthermore, this shifts also the main work
away from the mobile host to the server (most likely in the fixed network), since
the receiver of the encrypted message has to obtain the certificate for the sender.
The receiver makes its decision, whether or not to grant a service to the requester,
based on the validity of the ticket, decryptable with the public key included in the
certificate. Therefore, it reduces the incurred overhead for the exchange of messages
to and from the mobile host.
Another deciding factor is the absence of a delegation option in Kerberos.
Although this is remedied in version 5, it induces additional message exchanges.
Mobile users are certainly interested in delegating to a remote machines. Since the
computing power and memory are limited on the mobile host, a user will use his
mobile host as a "terminal" for a remote host. This could be either for performing
work directly on that machine, or for connecting to other machines to transfer data
or execute operations there.
The IP dependence of Kerberos is also an advantage to SPX. In contrast to
a workstation, the network address of a mobile host does change while it is moving
around. In the Kerberos protocol, the network address is used in the authentication
procedure to prove the origin of the service request. Therefore, an assignment of a
new or temporary network address in another network leads to the invalidity of the
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ticket, and the denial of service. This, consequently, requires the request of a new
ticket associated with every new network address.
Another disadvantage of the Kerberos protocol is its reliance on timestamps
to prevent replay attacks. It includes the timestamp in the ticket and also in the
authenticator. First of all, timestamps require roughly synchronized clocks, in order
to work properly. Therefore, there would have to be a coordination of the clock
synchronization in different domains, which is unlikely. In addition, the unreliability
of the wireless link, if used, may cause an increased delay or loss of messages, leading
to tickets and authenticators to be considered stale and not acceptable any more.
The use of a nonce, as in SPX, removes this dependence on synchronized clocks,
while still preventing replay of previously recorded messages.
Furthermore, the lifetime of the tickets in Kerberos is limited. This raises the
problem of how long should a ticket be valid? A short lifetime is inconvenient, because
every new request for a ticket—granting ticket requires the entry of the password. On
the other hand, long—lived tickets are vulnerable to capture. This holds especially
in the mobile environment, where any intercepted ticket can be used to impersonate
the user after he leaves the cell. In SPX the principal creates the ticket for itself,
and thus is able to adjust the validity to the changing requirements of the different
environments.
Last, but not least, it is planned to incorporate the certificate distribution of
SPX in the future in an ubiquitous directory service (i.e., X.500). Hence, it will then
be possible to retrieve certificates in the same manner as already implemented for the
other attributes of a principal, like the name, organization of a user, his telephone
number, etc. .
CHAPTER 7
ADAPTATION OF A MECHANISM
7.1 General
In order to establish an authentication mechanism in the mobile environment, it
is necessary to understand how such a mobile network is structured, how messages
are exchanged, and how a user moves around. Furthermore, it must be considered
how far the needed facilities for such a mechanism can be incorporated with existing
features and properties.
Among the possible network topologies, the simplest and probably the most
common architecture, is that of a static infrastructure forming a tree, with "cells"
where the mobile units (MUs) are attached at the leaves. The intermediate nodes
represent some kind of authority or database that keep track of the MUs in the cells
located below them. They cover, for example, all cells of a company's area. Each
cell is a logical or physical area where MU can talk to the base station(s). That is,
the machine(s) that route traffic from the MUs in the cell to the rest of the network
and vice versa. The base stations are usually the endpoints of the fixed network.
MUs in the same "cell" may or may not be able to communicate directly with each
other; they may have to use the cell controller as a hub. It should be possible to
incorporate in this topology the hierarchical structure of the certification authorities
in order to combine the necessary registration in a new entered cell with the purpose
of authenticating the MU.
Naming and addressing are two very important, interrelated problems. The
problem is already complicated in a static world, but gets even more so by adding
the ability to move one or both endpoints of a connection while the connection is
active. In a static network, the address of a host is administratively determined by
its location. In a mobile network, the addresses of the network's entities have to be
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maintained and updated as the entities change locations. There must be a database,
be it centralized or distributed, about the location of each MU, and algorithms for
computing routes to them.
The system also has to know where each MU is. Eventually, the MU will
have to reveal its location, but this can happen in two possible ways: the MU can
notify the system every time it moves (active sign-on) and the system can then,
immediately or lazily, update its databases; another possiblility is that the system
can seek out the MU when it needs to talk to it (paging).
Before the network can route data to mobile stations (and, in most cases,
before it can receive data from them), the MU must register with the network. This
registration may serve either or both of the following purposes:
• Establish a location for the MU (for routing purposes).
• Identify and authenticate the MU (for security and accounting purposes).
The location establishment is beyond the scope of this thesis, and the authentication
procedure depends on the assumed scenario. Registration may occur when the MU
first comes on-line, finds a "base station", and handshakes with it. The base station
then has the option of storing the location information locally, propagating it to a
centralized database, or to other, possibly neighboring base stations. Propagating
information facilitates the verification of the user's identity and the assessment of his
trustworthiness. The receiving base stations can also provide additional information
about experiences and incidents with the user. Keeping this location information has
the advantage that the network knows where the MU is, when it needs to contact
the MU.
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As far as the user is concerned, the incorporation of the authentication
mechanism should fulfill certain criterias:
1. Be as transparent as possible
2. Have as little as possible influence on the performance
3. Preserve user confidentiality
Except the initial log—in, the user should not need to perform any additional action
to authenticate himself to a service or a foreign domain. This is mainly achieved by
the credentials, a user carries with him. When requesting a service or entering a new
domain, the information included in the credentials, in particular the private key of
the user, is used as proof of the user's identity.
Regarding performance, there are two aspects to consider. First, the delay
incurred by the process of handing—off a user from one domain to another, and
second the computing power and memory used by the authentication procedure. This
includes operations like encryption, key generation, and keeping the state during the
authentication exchange. There is a tradeoff between these two aspects. Keeping less
state information imposes larger messages, and thus a greater delay. On the other
hand, keeping more state information requires more memory, but reduces commu-
nication for the smaller messages. Computing power and memory can be saved by
shifting as much as possible of the workload to the fixed network. In addition, it is
preferable to use for example signatures which need significantly less computation
than the full encryption of a message.
In order to provide user confidentiality, user identification information must
be protected from disclosure. This is especially important for the user's credentials,
since everybody in possession of the private key can impersonate the user. It can be
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done with the use of a device like a Smartcardl, and by exposing as less as possible
of this vulnerable data to the communication medium.
7.2 Possible Scenarios
7.2.1 Movement within one cell
The easiest scenario to handle is the one when a mobile user is only moving within
one cell without leaving it. The authentication procedure is similar to logging into
a workstation, except that it might have to cope with the problems of the wireless
link, if used. Distortion and noise can cause loss or delay of messages expected by a
communication peer. Hence, the timestamps in the ticket can become stale, leading
to the denial of the requested service. Besides the prevention of replay attacks, the
coping with stale tickets is the main reason for using a challenge—response exchange 2
with nonces instead of timestamps. In order to determine whether or not a message
including a nonce has to be considered stale, the party who created the nonce keeps
a record about it that also includes a validity interval.
Analogous to the workstation environment, the mobile user is authenticated,
not the machine he is sitting at, since the machine itself doesn't provide a high means
of protection against penetration. There is usually only the password that prevents
access to the machine. Moreover, a mobile unit, be it a laptop or a palmtop, is much
more vulnerable against theft, merely due to its physical dimensions.
It must be distinguished whether the user logs into his home network or into
a foreign network. Presently, without the possibility to retrieve the user's certificate
1 A Smartcard is a small device incorporating a processor and memory which can be
carried by the user for identification. It can hold authentication—related data and the user's
credentials protected by a strong key. The user can activate it by entering of a PIN.
2In a challenge—response exchange, one party generates a random number, and sends
it over to its communication peer. The peer encrypts the random number with its private
key, which is a sufficient proof of its identity, then it is sent back. The originator of the
random number can verify the identity of its peer by decrypting the response with the
corresponding public key.
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from an ubiquitous directory service, the base station of a foreign network has to
interact with the home domain of the user in order to provide him with his initial
credentials. This might incur a considerable overhead. Thereby, slowing down
running applications, since they have to wait for the authentication procedure to
complete before they can proceed in the foreign domain. A way to remedy this
problem would be to forward the credentials from one base station to the next one.
They could be conveyed within the location-updating exchange from the preceding
base station to the current one. A better solution, also with respect to user confi-
dentiality, would be the use of a Smartcard or a similar device. Hence, the user can
carry all his security-related information with him in a secure fashion, making use
of them on demand.
Besides that, when a user has received his credentials , and wants to authenticate
himself to a service, he does not need to initiate any specific actions different from
the ones he would perform in the a fixed network (see section 4.4. for details).
After the user is authenticated in one cell, there should be no additional authen-
tication involved while he is moving around. Due to the higher vulnerability of a
mobile unit, it might be feasible to reinsure every now and then that the user is still
the same as authenticated. This could be possible by simply encrypting the beacon,
frequently sent by the base station, or responses to the user, with the user's public
key. Therefore, only the user in possession of the private key is able to decrypt it.
7.2.2 Movement between cells, but within the same domain
The next step toward a complete registration of mobile users wherever they are
located, as far as authentication is concerned, is the consideration of the movement
between cells, but still within the same domain.
A domain has a physical as well as a logical dimension. The physical dimension
is the area covered by the cells it is composed of, whereas the logical one depends
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upon factors like an organization boundary. As long as a user stays within the same
domain, he can assume that the security policy and the authentication mechanism
remains the same. For example, a company will trust an employee to be the one he
claims to be, no matter where he is located on company grounds.
This implies that an extensive authentication with establishment of a temporary
residence is not necessarily needed. When a user enters a new cell, he has to register
with the base station of this cell in order to obtain services from it. He has to
identify himself for accounting and security purposes. The base station of the new
cell determines the degree of authentication needed in order to grant services to the
user. In certain circumstances, like when entering an area with increased security
requirements, it might be necessary for the base station to interact with the user's
home base in order to authenticate him properly. However, usually the certificate of
a user should be enough proof of his identity. This follows the idea to avoid authen-
tication, if possible. It saves the overhead incurred in a complete authentication
procedure, both communication costs, computing power and memory consumed.
To prevent against replay of tickets from a user who has already left the cell, it
is favorable to use a challenge—response exchange instead of including a timestamp,
and recording previously received tickets. This is especially important during the
time a user is in transit from one cell to the other, until he pops—up in a new one.
7.2.3 Movement between different domains
Before any authentication is possible in a foreign domain, there has to be an
agreement about the authentication mechanism used. This agreement can either
be reached by prior negotiation, or by following a policy set by some higher level
authority.
There is a difference between a user popping—up in a foreign domain and one
moving between two adjacent foreign domains. While a user makes his way from
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one domain to another, his credibility must be confirmed with every crossing of
domain boundaries. There has to be a hand-off from one domain to the next one,
including the user's state, current session activities and authentication information.
To facilitate the obtaining of information about the user, the base station can refer
to the authority in the preceding domain instead of interacting with the user's home
domain every time.
In general, we can not assume that the path taken by a mobile user is
continuous. That is, a user may operate in one domain and several hours later
pop-up in another domain thousands of miles away, e.g., an eight hour flight from
Germany to the United States carries a user between two distant, non-adjacent
domains. This case is similar to the one when a user initially pops-up in a foreign
domain, with the difference that he has already obtained his credentials.
When a user first contacts the base station of a cell in the foreign domain, the
base station will recognize him as coming from another domain. The new domain
needs to establish temporary residence and some form of address convention for the
entrant in order to send him messages. In contrast to the previous scenario, a base
station in a new domain is certainly interested to learn about the user's identity.
Instead of the original authentication exchange that is initiated by the user, this
time the base station, as the contact point to the network and thus service provider,
initiates the exchange. It sends some kind of unique value to the user. The user adds
his name, encrypts it with his private key, and sends it back to the base station. The
base station obtains the certificate for the user, and verifies his identity by decrypting
the response from the user. When the base station decides to grant service to the
mobile user, it also provides him with its certificate issued from one of the user's
trusted authorities. Thus, the user can verify the identity of the network entered.
If the base station is not satisfied with the information provided by the user,
it has to contact the home authority of the user. In order to obtain information
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about the user from his home domain, it might be necessary to traverse intermediate
networks. When there are some untrusted networks, it is possible to circumvent
them by the use of cross-certification paths. They can also be used to optimize
frequently occurring authentication between domains. Other means of information
retrieval about the user are described in section 7. 2. 1 (forwarding and Smartcard).
CHAPTER 8
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
This thesis presented a study about the incorporation of authentication in mobile
computing. It included a comparison of the two predominant authentication
mechanisms, namely Kerberos and SPX, with respect to the mobile environment.
It has taken into account the limited computing power and memory of the mobile
devices, as well as the problems induced by the unreliability of the communication
medium, at least when wireless communication is involved.
After considering the advantages and disadvantages of both mechanisms in
regard to different areas, SPX seems to be the preferable choice in this kind of
environment. This selection is mainly based on the increased security, the removal of
the trust relationships between domain by the use of certificates, non-IP dependence,
the use of nonces instead of timestamps, and the possibility of delegation provided
by SPX.
Due to the fact that the adaptation of SPX in the mobile environment is only
based on theoretical background, it has rather to be seen as suggestions of what can
be done, and what might be the changes necessary in the protocol. It doesn't claim
to be any kind of implementation.
Further work must certainly include an implementation in order to verify the
assumptions made about the environment and the devices. It has to be shown that
the mobile devices and the communication medium are already capable of performing
the authentication procedure. The incorporation of the authentication procedure
shouldn't penalize the performance of other application. Furthermore, the procedure
of authenticating a user while moving around should, with the exception of the initial
login, be transparent to the user.
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APPENDIX A
COMPARISON OF KERBEROS AND SPX
Area Kerberos SPX Preference
Cryptosystem Sekret-key Public-key None
Naming 3-component Name Distinguished Names SPX
IP dependence IP network address
in authenticator
Independent on under-
laying network protocol
SPX
Subsequent
authentication
New session keys Certificates SPX
Delegation Additional message
exchange
Conveyed in
authentication exchange
SPX
Inter-domain
authentication
Exchange session keys
between domains
Resolve certification
path
SPX
Ticket-Lifetime Restricted to 21 hours No restriction SPX
Timestamps In Authenticator Substitutable by nonce SPX
Encryption
mechanism
Only DES RSA or any other SPX
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